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Normative Legal Positivism: from Metaphysics to Politics. Some remarks on Positivismo jurídico 'interno' by María Cristina Redondo

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Vincent
AutorSilvia Zorzetto
CargoUniversity of Milan, Department of Legal Science 'Cesare Beccaria', Italy
Páginas134-166
Isonomía • Núm. 54 • 2021 • 10.5347/isonomia.v0i54.463• [134]
Abstract: Taking as its starting point María Cristina Redondo’s book Positivismo jurídico “in-
te rn o”-
cle argues that legal theory can be neutral to the extent that it is intersubjective and transparent
regarding its own metaphysical premises. On the one hand, thus, the article aims to shed light
on the role of metaphysics and common sense in the construction of the concept of law. On the
other hand, it seeks to make more transparent the ethical-political choices that constitute legal

theses on the ontology / epistemology distinction and the possibility of objective knowledge,
and advances the idea that inter-subjectivity, and not objectivity, should be the appropriate cri-
terion for normativist legal positivism. Second, the article examines the role of normativity in
normativist legal positivism, focusing on the metaphysical nature of the thesis that law belongs
-
nist and anti-reductionist conceptions of legal “entities” (norms, normative statements, propo-

the axiological neutrality of legal theor y and discusses the possibility of describing participants’
internal point of view without committing to existing legal practice(s).
Keywords: common sense, legal method, legal positivism, metaphysics, normativity.
Resumen: El presente trabajo toma como punto de partida el libro Positivismo jurídico “inter-
no” , de María Cristina Redondo, y propone una concepción alternativa de positivismo jurídico

 -
 
metafísica y el sentido común en la construcción del concepto de derecho; por el otro lado, el
    
 
distinción entre ontología y epistemología y la posibilidad de conocimiento objetivo: la idea
Normative Legal Positivism: from Metaphysics to Politics
Positivismo jurídico normativo: de la metafísica a la política
Silvia Zorzetto
University of Milan – Department of Legal
Science “Cesare Beccaria”, Italy
silvia.zorzetto@unimi.it
[135] Isonomía • Núm. 54 • 2021
Normative Legal Positivism: om Metaphysics to Politics
-
 


examinan las concepciones reduccionistas y anti-reduccionistas sobre las “entidades” jurídicas
(normas, enunciados normativos, proposiciones y creencias) y la teoría de las fuentes del dere-

la posibilidad de describir el punto de vista interno de los participantes sin asumir compromiso
alguno con la práctica jurídica existente.
Palabras clave: sentido común, método jurídico, positivismo jurídico, metafísica, normati-
vidad.
I. Introduction
Positivismo jurídico “interno”

contemporary legal theory.
-
tion that goes beyond the usual discussions in the literature, focusing obsessively on the
debate between legal positivism (inclusive and exclusive) and anti-positivism.
  
go back to the author’s dissertation (Redondo 1994-1995), and which has developed
   -
dies devoted to normativity and the notions of reason and rule (Redondo 1996, 1999,
2003), as well as to the notion of (legal) duty (Redondo 1998a, 2001); to her work
on the distinction between internal and external points of view and the acceptance
     
l rouge



Redondo’s positivismo jurídico normativista.
As the preface makes clear, the analysis has a critical-reconstructive purpose aiming
to defend what Redondo calls “internal” (“interno”)1 or “normative” (“normativista”)
legal positivism.
On the one hand, Redondo defends the positivist standpoint against some of the
Isonomía • Núm. 54 • 2021 • [136]
DOI:10.5347/isonomia.v0i54.463Silvia Zorzetto
-

e.g. 9, 149, 157).2
   
specially on the criticisms of the so-called “realist” positivists who defend a purely em-
pirical conception of jurisprudence (Redondo calls this view “positivismo escéptico”; see
3


legal norms are not empirical entities; the existence of a valid norm corresponds to
the existence of a legal obligation (Chapter 1).
      

content) and vice versa (Chapter 1).

-
  


a duty/norm presupposes that we can grasp or understand directly the criterion fo-

criterion, i.e., when the propositions expressing norms are true or false in this res-
pect (Chapter 1).
iv. Knowledge of duties is objective insofar as it rests on an absolute notion of truth.

of a legal rule consist in the existence of a duty, i.e.
 i.e., the distinction between the ontolo-

truth-value of the propositions expressing it (Chapter 1).
v. Knowledge of legal norms is based on public reasons, which are open to any re-
asonable person who takes the trouble to learn the concepts necessary for such a
process of knowledge (Chapter 1).
-

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