SUTTON'S SOLUTION TO THE GROUNDING PROBLEM AND INTRINSICALLY COMPOSED COLOCATED OBJECTS.
| Autor | Campdelacreu, Marta |
| Cargo | Ensayo |
-
Introduction
In Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton considers one of the most challenging questions for colocationism. Colocationism claims that two or more non-identical objects can be composed, at the same time, of the same parts. This would be so for, at least, one level of decomposition of the objects into parts. (1) Therefore, the colocated objects would also share, at that given time, the matter of which they are made and the region where they are situated.
Let me present the case-study in terms of which the question is usually formulated. Imagine an artist who creates a statue, STATUE, from a piece of clay, CLAY, which comes into existence at the same time as STATUE (cf. Gibbard 1975): imagine that the artist has moulded the two future parts of STATUE (from the top of the statue to the middle, and from the middle to the bottom) separately and that she assembles them thus creating STATUE and CLAY at the same time. Imagine, as well, that STATUE and CLAY cease to exist at exactly the same time. Then, STATUE and CLAY have exactly the same parts (at least at a certain level of decomposition) and share their matter and spatial location. However, colocationists think that they are different objects: they have different properties and, by Leibniz's Law, they are different objects. The properties which they do not share, and which are usually mentioned in the literature with regard to the problem, are modal properties and sortal properties (see, for example, Fine (2003) for more examples of non-shared properties that could also be used in the formulation of the problem). Here I am going to focus on sortal properties, as Sutton does most of the time (Sutton also uses "kind properties" but I assume that this is another way to refer to sortal properties). STATUE is a statue and might lose some of its matter without ceasing to exist. CLAY is a piece of clay and cannot lose a relevant portion of its matter without ceasing to exist.
One of the most challenging questions for this position is the so-called "grounding problem". Sutton formulates it in the following way. What is it that grounds the difference in properties (for example, in sortal properties or in modal properties) of STATUE and CLAY? For, Sutton says, they "are in the same environment and inherit properties from the same composing parts. But differences in properties should be grounded" (2012, pp. 703-704). (2)
In this paper I would like to consider Sutton's answer to the grounding problem and argue that one of its theses is not correct. But then, if I am right in my criticisms, the proposal can no longer be considered a complete answer to the grounding problem. And it is not obvious how it might be supplemented in order to achieve this.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I present Sutton's solution to the grounding problem. In section 3, I discuss her claims regarding lumps or pieces of matter, and argue that, if I am right in my analysis, her solution to the grounding problem is no longer complete. Finally, I briefly consider, but reject, a possible way to supplement it.
-
Sutton's Answer to the Grounding Problem
Let me present Sutton's general solution to the grounding problem. First, she defines intrinsic and extrinsic composition in the following way (p. 709): (3)
Extrinsic Composition: an object O is extrinsically composed iff O's being composed (and thus O's existence) is grounded in part by relations that O's parts stand in to things that are not parts of O. Intrinsic Composition: an object O is intrinsically composed iff O's being composed (and thus O's existence) is not grounded, even in part, by relations that O's parts stand in to things that are not parts of O. Sutton's general proposal is the following. The two colocated objects share their parts, but at most one of them is intrinsically composed. There is, always, at least one of the objects whose composition, whose existence, is grounded (at least in part) in the extrinsic relations in which its parts stand to external things. Moreover, when the two objects are extrinsically composed, then the relations that their shared parts stand in to other external things are different. But then, for every two colocated objects, the relations that their shared parts enter into and ground their respective compositions are different. These different relations that the two objects' shared parts enter into ground the difference in their sortal properties. In more detail:
Firstly, in cases in which one of the objects is intrinsically composed and the other extrinsically composed, the relations in which their shared parts stand and which ground their composition are different. For one of the objects is extrinsically composed and so has its composition grounded, at least in part, in relations that its parts stand in to external things. However, the other object, which is intrinsically composed, does not have its composition grounded in any extrinsic relation. This difference in the relations that the objects' shared parts stand in grounds the difference in their sortal properties. This is the case, for example, of masses of matter colocated with diamonds. For Sutton claims that masses of matter (if, in the end, they exist, which she doubts) are extrinsically composed (section 2.6), as their existence is grounded in relations that their parts stand in to human intentions about masses of matter, and that diamonds are intrinsically composed (section 3). Also, this is the case of lumps or pieces of matter colocated with other non-living natural objects. For Sutton argues that lumps or pieces of matter are extrinsically composed (p. 712) (their composition is grounded in the relations that their parts stand in to human intentions about lumps or pieces of matter) and that, in general, non-living natural objects are intrinsically composed (section 3).
Secondly, there are cases in which the two objects have their composition, and thus their existence, grounded (at least partly) in extrinsic relations in which their shared parts stand to external things (both of them are extrinsically composed). In these cases, the two (sets of) extrinsic relations are different. The difference in these relations grounds the difference in the objects' sortal properties. For example, in Sutton's opinion, this is what happens in the case of STATUE and CLAY. She claims that both objects are extrinsically composed and that their existence and composition are grounded in different extrinsic relations whose shared parts stand in to external things. In the case of STATUE the parts stand in an extrinsic relation to human intentions about statues, and in the case of CLAY they stand in an extrinsic relation to human intentions about lumps. Other cases that can be analysed along the same lines are, for example, those of artefacts (whose composition is grounded in the relations that their parts stand in to human intentions about the relevant sort of artefact) and the pieces or lumps of matter with which they are colocated (for all these cases, see section 2, especially pp. 707-710) or those of animals and the lumps of tissue with which they are colocated. In this latter case the animals would be extrinsically composed because their composition is grounded, at least in part, in the extrinsic relations in which their parts stand in to other members of the species in question (p. 724).
-
A Problem for Sutton's Solution
I agree with many of Sutton's claims regarding the extrinsic composition of certain objects. For example, I entirely agree with her that our STATUE, and other artefacts, are extrinsically composed. It seems plausible to think that the existence and composition of STATUE (or of other artefacts) is grounded, in part, by the relation in which the object's parts stand to human intentions about statues (or about the sort of artefact in question). (4) In general, it seems plausible to think that there would not be all the variety of artefacts there in fact are if humans didn't exist.
This being so, it seems plausible to believe that, in general, these relations of an object's parts to other objects can play a role in solving the grounding problem in which one of the two colocated objects is...
Para continuar leyendo
Solicita tu pruebaCOPYRIGHT GALE, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.
