First Person Authority and Knowledge of One's Own Actions
| Autor | Martin F. Fricke |
| Cargo | Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas y Centro Peninsular en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. Vol. 45, No. 134 (agosto 2013): 3–16
FIRST PERSON AUTHORITY AND KNOWLEDGE
OF ONE’S OWN ACTIONS
MART IN F. F RIC KE
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
y Centro Peninsular en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
martin_fricke@yahoo.co.uk
SUM MAR Y: What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of
one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act
that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for
which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes
some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of
circularity. In this paper, I examine the view attributed to Moran. I rebut the charge
of circularity, but also reject the theory as an adequate interpretation of Moran.
KEY W ORD S: self-knowledge, transparency, belief, Richard Moran, Carlos Moya
RES UME N: ¿Qué relación existe entre la autoridad de la primera persona y el conoci-
miento de las propias acciones? Una posibilidad es que gracias al conocimiento de las
razones que tenemos para actuar sabemos qué es lo que hacemos y, análogamente,
gracias al conocimiento de las razones que tenemos para admitir [avow] una creencia
sabemos qué es lo que creemos. Carlos Moya (2006) atribuye una teoría de este
tipo a Richard Moran (2001) y la critica por ser circular. En este trabajo examino
la teoría atribuida a Moran, refuto la idea de circularidad, pero también rechazo la
teoría como una interpretación adecuada de Moran.
PAL ABR AS C LAV E: autoconocimiento, transparencia, creencia, Richard Moran,
Carlos Moya
In Crítica, vol. 38, no. 114 (2006), Carlos Moya ascribes a theory
of self-knowledge to Richard Moran according to which knowledge
of one’s own actions explains authoritative knowledge of one’s own
beliefs. This is because, on this interpretation of Moran’s theory,
knowing of one’s own beliefs is a special case of knowledge of one’s
own actions. Moya criticises this account of self-knowledge on the
grounds of circularity. In this discussion note, I examine the relation
between the two types of knowledge in Moran’s theory. I shall try
to show that Moran’s reference to knowledge of one’s own actions
is not an attempt to give the finer detail of how we acquire self-
knowledge with respect to beliefs. Rather, it is an illustrative analogy.
But perhaps Moya is right in that Moran’s account of knowledge of
one’s own beliefs is incomplete. If it is, then, so I shall suggest, his
account of knowledge of one’s own actions is as well.1
1Many of Moran’s readers think that his account is important (e.g. Heal 2004,
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