IS MORAL PERCEPTION ESSENTIALLY RULE-GOVERNED? A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF GENERALISM AND A LIMITED DEFENSE OF PARTICULARISM.
| Autor | Tsu, Peter Shiu-Hwa |
| Cargo | Ensayo |
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Introduction: The Problem of Moral Perception
Suppose that you witnessed a cold-blooded killing. You saw the killer stab a man with a dagger. And you heard the victim cry out and scream, begging the killer to stop. Yet, the killer didn't relent and just stabbed the man again and again, finishing off with a fatal stab at the man's heart. When the killer pulled out the dagger, you saw it dripping with blood. You feel horrified at the sight of this, hiding in the corner of the room, hoping that the killer would not see you.
Such a scenario is indeed horrifying. And ceteris paribus, you would rightly judge that what you witnessed is morally horrendous and wrong. But how do you come to know its moral wrongness? After all, the property of moral wrongness, unlike the property of killing you witnessed, is not something you can perceive through your five senses. The property of moral wrongness does not have a size or color, nor does it smell, make a noise, or have a weight that you can feel for that matter. To prevent ourselves from falling into the trap of moral perception skepticism, according to which moral properties, even if they exist, are beyond our perceptual reach, it seems imperative for us to provide an account of how we come to be perceptually acquainted with moral properties. (1) The task of providing such an account constitutes what I call 'the problem of moral perception'. (2)
In fact, the problem of moral perception has been philosophers' one million dollar question since Hume, not the least because moral perception is often seen as a potential source of moral knowledge. (3) In addressing this problem, Hume himself takes a sentimentalist view, maintaining that the moral properties are nothing more than the sentiments or emotions we have in our mind, and we come to be acquainted with them via introspection. However, nowadays, not too many find this account convincing. For one thing, the killing still seems to be morally wrong, even if the witness, or indeed anyone, doesn't have any negative sentiments towards it.
Since Hume, various alternative accounts have been proposed to meet the challenge to provide a plausible account of moral perception. (4) Some argue that we can literally perceive moral properties, by extending the scope of our sensory modalities beyond the five senses, whereas others maintain that moral properties are reducible to natural properties, and therefore we can perceive them without postulating extra-sensory moral faculty. (5) Still others maintain that we have a rational capacity that enables us to capture moral properties in pretty much the same way as it enables us to capture mathematical properties. (6) Finally, Audi (2013) recently came up with an intriguing proposal: moral properties, though non-reducible to natural properties, can be indirectly perceived through those that ground them. (7) For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on a prominent account proposed by the moral generalists, according to which the structure of moral perception is essentially governed by (exceptionless) moral rules that connect natural properties with moral properties (such as 'killing is wrong/wrong-making'). (8,9) It is through the application of these 'natural-moral rules', as we may call them, that we come to perceive the moral properties of things. (10)
This generalist model has gradually taken shape in the discussion of moral perception, being endorsed by a number of eminent philosophers, including, for instance, Andy Clark (1996), Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit (2000), Barbara Herman (1985), Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge (2006). These generalists argue from both empirical and conceptual fronts that moral perception must be essentially rule-governed. For instance, Clark argues from the perspective of cognitive sciences that in order for collaborative moral problem solving to be actually possible, rules are indispensable in our moral perception. Advocating a classical model of moral perception, Jackson, Smith and Pettit maintain that our moral perception is not naturally shapeless and can thus be codified by rules. Herman, on the other hand, argues on the conceptual front that the Kantian model of moral judgment, to be plausible, needs to be supplemented with an RMS generalist model of moral perception, according to which moral perception is essentially structured by what Herman calls 'rules of moral salience' (RMS). Finally, McKeever and Ridge contend that for practical wisdom not to be a chimera, moral perception must be rule-governed.
These generalists' arguments are quite powerful, but wrong, or so I will argue. Although there have been quite a few anti-generalist (or particularist) theorizations about moral perception, (11) these powerful generalist arguments have not received any systematic examination from the particularist camp, as far as I know. (12) Nor do they receive their deserved attention in the current literature on moral perception on the whole, much to one's dismay. (13) This paper aims to take up the slack by addressing them and provide a limited defense of particularism, or the anti-generalist view that moral perception is not essentially structured by moral rules. According to the particularists, we perceive moral properties of things via a kind of non-rulegoverned moral sensitivity that is essentially embedded in our 'form of life', to borrow a term from Wittgenstein. Positive arguments for particularism will also be provided along the way. Hopefully, we will end up seeing particularist theory of moral perception in a more favorable light.
Here's the plan of how we will proceed. First of all, I will argue that the sort of moral rules advocated by Herman not only are insufficient to account for moral perception, but are not necessary for it, either. Drawing on the works of John McDowell, I will provide a particularist explanation of how moral perception is possible without being governed by the Hermanian rules of moral salience.
Second, as some particularists invoke connectionism in cognitive sciences to support particularism, some generalists counteract by arguing against connectionism. For instance, Jackson, Smith, and Pettit, qua generalists, bolster classical rule-based model of moral perception against connectionism, maintaining that particularism rests on a shaky foundation. I will argue, however, that Jackson, Smith and Pettit's classical model faces insurmountable difficulties accounting for typicality. On the other hand, others contend that although connectionism itself is plausible, the particularists misunderstand its implications. Connectionism, Clark argues for instance, does not warrant the marginalization of moral rules. I agree, but the sorts of moral rules Clark has in mind (i.e. the summary moral rules, as we shall see later) are too weak to harm particularism, or so I will argue.
Finally, I will argue against McKeever and Ridge's claim that the moral perception of the practically wise is essentially governed by a finite and manageable set of rules. Instead, I will shoulder the task of explaining how a particularist practically wise person can come to have moral perception, given the fact that the number of potentially morally relevant features is large or even infinite.
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Herman's RMS Model
According to Herman, an eminent Kantian scholar, a Kantian model of our practice of moral judgment needs to be supplemented with a model of moral perception in order for it to be viable. This model of moral perception has to supply the moral agent with morally salient features of the situations he faces, so that he can go on to formulate his maxim (or the subjective principle for his action) in terms of them, put the maxim to the test of universalizability, and finally make a moral judgment on the basis of the test result.
What is distinctive about this model of moral perception, according to Herman, is that the moral agent perceives the morally salient features through the lens of what Herman calls 'rules of moral salience' (or RMS for short). To be more specific, the content of the RMS is as follows: 'x is morally salient' (x is a variable for natural features). When the moral agent perceives through the lens of RMS, he comes to perceive the moral salience of lying, stealing, helping others, fulfilling one's promise, and the likes. That is, the RMS highlight the moral salience of some natural features. Without the RMS in operation, there is no way for us to perceive the moral salience of the natural features, according to Herman. For Herman, the RMS constitute the structure of our moral perception or sensitivities. If so, a generalist model of moral perception, according to which moral rules play an indispensable role in our moral perception, can be vindicated.
Against this, it can be immediately questioned whether the morally salient features are exhausted by RMS. If not, then this would show that there are at least some morally salient features that are not specified by RMS. That is, we might well perceive the moral salience of some natural features without the help of RMS. And it follows from this that it would be an exaggeration to contend that RMS constitute the essential structure of moral perception.
And I do think there is reason to believe that the morally salient features, being potentially infinite in number, cannot be exhausted by RMS, which are presumably finite. The RMS have to be finite in number, for no human being, being cognitively limited, can be mentally equipped with an infinite number of RMS. On the other hand, the morally salient features are potentially infinite. How so? This is due to the context-dependent nature of moral salience. Any natural feature, when situated in the right context, can be morally salient. For instance, wearing yellow shoelaces, though normally morally unsalient, can become morally salient if you promise your girlfriend to do so when you go out with her on a date. Or an action...
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