A Defense of the Contrastive Theory of Causation
| Autor | Esteban Céspedes |
| Cargo | Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Valparaíso |
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CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. Vol. 47, No. 140 (agosto 2015): 93–99
A DEFENSE OF THE CONTRASTIVE THEORY OF CAUSATION
ESTEBAN CÉSPEDES
Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Valparaíso estebancespedes@aol.com
SUMMARY: An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.
KEY WORDS: contrastivism, counterfactual conditional, general causation, singular causation, causal claim
RESUMEN: Un argumento que Steglich-Petersen (2012) propone establece que si bien es posible aplicar una noción contrastiva de la causación a casos de causación general y de explicación causal, es un error considerarla en casos de causación singular. Intentaré mostrar que no existe dicho error. El argumento de Steglich-Petersen no parece ser lo suficientemente fuerte y es, de hecho, circular. Además, argumentaré brevemente que aunque asumiéramos que su argumento fuera válido, seguiría habiendo una respuesta desde el punto de vista de la teoría contrastiva de la causación.
PALABRAS CLAVE: contrastivismo, condicional contrafáctico, causación general, causación singular, enunciado causal
1 . Contrastive Causation
Steglich-Petersen argues that the contrastive theory of causation fails to handle cases of singular causation, i.e. cases involving singular events instead of event types. In order to show how his argument proceeds, I am going to explain first what the theory in question establishes. One of the first accounts of contrastive causation was provided by Dretske (1977) and it has been discussed more recently by other authors (Hitchcock 1996; Schaffer 2005; Northcott 2008). The main idea of the contrastive theory of causation is the following (Steglich-Petersen 2012, p. 117):
(1) Contrastive causation: Binary causal claims of the form “A caused B” are semantically incomplete and should be analysed as causal claims involving relevant contrasts or sets of contrasts.
Steglich-Petersen considers the following example to show the incompleteness of binary causal claims:
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(2) Susan stealing the bicycle caused her arrest.
This binary statement is semantically incomplete, because it can refer to different alternatives, which have the form of contrastive causal claims:
(3) Susan stealing the bicycle rather than purchasing it caused her arrest.
(4) Susan stealing the bicycle rather than stealing something else caused her arrest.
While in proposition 3 the contrast is made in relation with the stealing, in proposition 4 it is made about the bicycle. Contrasts to effects will not be considered in the present discussion, because these are not involved in Steglich-Petersen’s argument against the contrastive account of causation. According to the contrastive view of causation, truth conditions of proposition 2 may vary, as one may expect considering the propositions where the contrasts are made explicit. A contrastive theory of singular causation analyses the causal relation in the following way, where A, A and B are descriptions of singular events:
(5) “A rather than A caused B” is true if and only if, had A happened instead of A, B would not have happened.
On the other hand, the counterfactual account of causation is a good example of a theory focused on the analysis of binary causal statements:
(6) “A caused B” is true if and only if, had A not happened, B would not have happened.
The first clear conterfactual account of causation was presented by Lewis (1973) and is the subject of recent discussion (Collins et al. 2004; Spohn 2006; Huber 2011). The meaning of contrastive causal claims and binary causal claims seem to differ only with regard to...
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