Revisiting Raz: A Reply
| Autor | Margaret Martin |
| Cargo | Faculty of Law ? Western University, Canada |
| Páginas | 212-242 |
Isonomía • Núm. 55 • 2021 •10.5347/isonomia.v0i55.489• [212]
Abstract: In Judging Positivism, I argue that Joseph Raz has changed his position over time
and that these changes produced inconsistencies and incoherencies in his mature position. e
key claim that sets the argument in motion is the following : Raz’s account of legal systems in
Practical Reasons and Norms (PRN) is grounded in, and dependent on, the claim that judges
have a duty to apply the law. It is a positivistic account of law that springs from a positivistic
account of adjudication. Problems emerge for Raz when he introduces moral elements into his
positivistic account of law. More specically, I explore the diculties Raz encounters when he
combines his pre-emption thesis with a moral theory of adjudication in Ethics in the Public Do-
main, and a morally robust theory of authority in e Morality of Freedom. André Coelho and
Jorge Fabra-Zamora take issue with my critique of Raz’s account of adjudication, while o-
mas Bustamante focuses his commentary on my analysis of Razian authority. In the course of
responding to my critics, I revisit my interpretation of PRN, while exploring the foundational
assumptions at play in the exchanges. I reject the possibility that all foundational assumptions
are equally valuable: non-normative conceptual analysis is, in my opinion, not a viable metho-
dology. I also explore the diculties of Raz’s account of authority: while the ambiguity found
in his core theses may account for its appeal, upon closer inspection, Raz struggles to keep any
distance between himself and his intellectual adversaries, including Bentham and the natural
lawyers.
Keywords: Raz, methodolog y, natural law, positivism, authority, adjudication.
Resumen: En Judging Positivism, sostengo que Joseph Raz cambió su posición con el paso
del tiempo y que esos cambios han producido inconsistencias e incoherencias. La tesis básica
que funda mi argumento es la siguiente: el análisis de los sistemas jurídicos en Practical Rea-
son and Norms (PRN) está basado en, y depende de, la tesis según la cual los jueces tienen un
deber de aplicar el derecho. Se trata de una concepción positivista del derecho que deriva de
una visión positivista de la función del juez. Los problemas surgen cuando Raz introduce en
ella elementos morales. En particular, analizo las dicultades a las que Raz se enfrenta cuando
Revisiting Raz: A Reply
De vuelta a Raz: una réplica
Margaret Martin
Faculty of Law – Western University, Canada
mmart2@uwo.ca
[213] Isonomía • Núm. 55 • 2021
Revisiting Raz: A Reply
introduce una teoría moral de la adjudicación en Ethics in the Public Domain (EPD), y una
teoría moralmente robusta de la autoridad en Morality of Freedom (MF). André Coelho y Jorge
Fabra-Zamora cuestionan mi crítica a la concepción raziana de la adjudicación, mientras que
omas Bustamante centra sus comentarios en mi análisis de la autoridad según Raz. Al con-
testar a mis críticos, vuelvo sobre mi interpretación de PRN, examinando al mismo tiempo las
premisas fundacionales que están en juego en estos debates. Rechazo la posibilidad de que to-
das las asunciones fundacionales sean igualmente valiosas: el análisis conceptual no normativo
no es, en mi opinión, una metodología viable. Vuelvo también sobre las dicultades a las cuales
se enfrenta la teoría de la autoridad de Raz: mientras que la ambigüedad de sus tesis principales
puede explicar su atractivo, una mirada más atenta muestra que Raz tiene dicultades para no
caer en el iusnaturalismo.
Palabras clave: Raz, metodología, derecho natural, positivismo, autoridad, adjudicación.
I. Introduction
In November of 2019 omas Bustamante hosted a colloquium on my bo ok, Judging
Positivism (henceforth JP), at a conference held by the Brazilian Association for Po-
litical Philosophy and Constitutional Law at the University of São Paulo. e papers
presented were eloquent and insightful. I remain grateful for the time and eort put
forth by each participant. I would like to extend my gratitude to omas Bustamante
for organizing the colloquium and for his excellent editorial work. In what follows, I
oer a reply to three of my critics: André Coelho, Jorge Fabra-Zamora, and omas
Bustamante. eir probing contributions are included in this issue of Isonomía.
In JP, I argue that Raz has changed his position over time and that these changes
have produced inconsistencies and incoherencies in his later works. e key claim that
sets the argument in motion is that Raz’s account of legality in Practical Reasons and
Norms (Raz, 1999, henceforth PRN) is grounded in, and dependent on, the claim that
judges have a duty to apply the law. While problems remain for Raz if he distances
himself from PRN, it is nevertheless very useful to return to this early work: we can see
how his theses about the nature of law and the nature of adjudication, which are now
considered wholly separate, were once mutually reinforcing. By returning to this early
work, the worries I track in JP are brought into focus. Problems arise for Raz, I arg ue,
when he introduces moral elements into his positivistic account of law.
For instance, in chapter three of my book, I argue that Raz’s morally robust theory
of adjudication ts uneasily with his positivistic theses about the nature of law. Raz,
I argue, champions a thesis about legal rights that is distinctively Holmesian. André
Coelho focuses his commentary on this line of argument. He claims that I have erred
in my interpretation of PRN: Raz’s account of law and adjudication, Coelho argues, is
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